Paul Ropp      

                                    Structured response # 1

            Resistance to democratization in the MENA region since the revolts of 2011 isn’t very surprising, in the simplest terms it is just the continuation of a trend; “since 1972 democratization in the MENA region has been in decline” (Bellin, 23). Why is it that the MENA region despite globalization, the fall of communism, and the growth of global democratization, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, cannot achieve more than just two electoral democracies? In the MENA region it all boils down to weak civil societies, economic dependence, and the Huntintonian view.

            In the MENA region the civil societies lack in political force, or in any force whatsoever “Labor unions are empty shells; businessmen lack autonomy and NGO’s lack indigenous grounding” (Bellin 22). These downfalls do not allow civil society to take hold in a nation state; the people as citizens lack organization, lack an identity that would lead to the democratization of the MENA region. Lack of civil society also poses problems to democratization as the regime does not have to answer to popular preference; but has the power to curb popular trends through force or coercion. However weak the civil society and strong the state is it is not the only factor in the domination of authoritarianism in the MENA region economics also play a strong role.

            Economics in the MENA region lay largely in the hands of the state; trade, jobs, and capital all are out of reach for the average person. In Egypt the government provides most jobs, that pay anything worthwhile, although this isn’t a sustainable course of economic development, or lack thereof; it works until the regime runs out of money or bullets. Regional economics play an even greater role when there is mass poverty and illiteracy “It is not unusual for a fifth of the population to be below the poverty line and 32% or more to be illiterate” (Bellin 23). It seems to me that a revolution is harder when the state distributes most of the wealth, this also leaves little room for sanctions to work if the majority of wealth comes from the state; revolutions cost money. States of the MENA region have a monopoly “on the means of coercion” (Skocpal). The states have money, power, and armies which in some cases, like Algeria, are independent of the state and have full autonomy within a state. Although economic dependency can make revolting difficult, Huntintonianism can make even organizing a revolution a monumental task.

            The clash of civilizations theory has proven itself a nuisance in the MENA region. After the 2011 revolutions it seemed that Egypt had rid itself of authoritarianism and replaced it with a blossoming electoral democracy full of peace and cooperation; however, that is not entirely true. There are deep divides in the Islamic and Christian sects in Egypt which have recently erupted in riots due to a less than tactful Youtube video; not to mention the Egyptian militaries autonomy in political matters. Cultural divides can be overcome as they were during the revolution, although, constant attention must be paid to the deep cultural divides between the Christian and Muslim sects in Egypt and other sects like Sunni and Shiite if any large scale democratization is to be made in the region.

            In light of the Arab spring I think Bellin’s arguments have proven pragmatic. In Egypt the military has taken up a sense of autonomy, and stark cultural divides have shown themselves. In Syria the government is only failing due to outside pressure “the patrons want to pay no longer”. In Tunisia the state lacked the ability and will to contain a revolution, as Bellin points out is a major factor in controlling a population; a country can have the  will but no power and vice versa. Bellin made exceptions in her argument for circumstance, which there was plenty of in Tunisia and Egypt; although Egypt has not been fully democratized in my opinion.