Paul Ropp
Structured
response # 1
Resistance
to democratization in the MENA region since the revolts of 2011 isn’t very
surprising, in the simplest terms it is just the continuation of a trend; “since
1972 democratization in the MENA region has been in decline” (Bellin, 23). Why
is it that the MENA region despite globalization, the fall of communism, and
the growth of global democratization, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, cannot
achieve more than just two electoral democracies? In the MENA region it all boils
down to weak civil societies, economic dependence, and the Huntintonian view.
In
the MENA region the civil societies lack in political force, or in any force
whatsoever “Labor unions are empty shells; businessmen lack autonomy and NGO’s
lack indigenous grounding” (Bellin 22). These downfalls do not allow civil
society to take hold in a nation state; the people as citizens lack
organization, lack an identity that would lead to the democratization of the
MENA region. Lack of civil society also poses problems to democratization as
the regime does not have to answer to popular preference; but has the power to
curb popular trends through force or coercion. However weak the civil society
and strong the state is it is not the only factor in the domination of
authoritarianism in the MENA region economics also play a strong role.
Economics
in the MENA region lay largely in the hands of the state; trade, jobs, and
capital all are out of reach for the average person. In Egypt the government
provides most jobs, that pay anything worthwhile, although this isn’t a
sustainable course of economic development, or lack thereof; it works until the
regime runs out of money or bullets. Regional economics play an even greater
role when there is mass poverty and illiteracy “It is not unusual for a fifth
of the population to be below the poverty line and 32% or more to be illiterate”
(Bellin 23). It seems to me that a revolution is harder when the state
distributes most of the wealth, this also leaves little room for sanctions to
work if the majority of wealth comes from the state; revolutions cost money.
States of the MENA region have a monopoly “on the means of coercion” (Skocpal).
The states have money, power, and armies which in some cases, like Algeria, are
independent of the state and have full autonomy within a state. Although
economic dependency can make revolting difficult, Huntintonianism can make even
organizing a revolution a monumental task.
The
clash of civilizations theory has proven itself a nuisance in the MENA region.
After the 2011 revolutions it seemed that Egypt had rid itself of
authoritarianism and replaced it with a blossoming electoral democracy full of
peace and cooperation; however, that is not entirely true. There are deep
divides in the Islamic and Christian sects in Egypt which have recently erupted
in riots due to a less than tactful Youtube
video; not to mention the Egyptian militaries autonomy in political matters.
Cultural divides can be overcome as they were during the revolution, although,
constant attention must be paid to the deep cultural divides between the
Christian and Muslim sects in Egypt and other sects like Sunni and Shiite if
any large scale democratization is to be made in the region.
In
light of the Arab spring I think Bellin’s arguments have proven pragmatic. In Egypt
the military has taken up a sense of autonomy, and stark cultural divides have
shown themselves. In Syria the government is only failing due to outside
pressure “the patrons want to pay no longer”. In Tunisia the state lacked the
ability and will to contain a revolution, as Bellin points out is a major
factor in controlling a population; a country can have the will but no power and vice versa. Bellin made
exceptions in her argument for circumstance, which there was plenty of in
Tunisia and Egypt; although Egypt has not been fully democratized in my
opinion.
